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Abstract 
 
Simulations are often employed as content-teaching tools in political science, but their effect on 
students’ reasoning skills is rarely assessed. This paper explores what effect the Statecraft simulation 
might have on undergraduate students’ perceptions of their decision making. As noted by the psychologist 
Daniel Kahneman (2012: 203), decisions are often evaluated on the basis of whether their outcomes are 
good or bad, not whether a sound reasoning process was used to reach them. A survey was administered 
at multiple points in an international relations course to gauge students’ satisfaction with the decision-
making processes and outcomes in their respective teams during the Statecraft simulation. Students also 
engaged in exercises in which their teams’ tentative plans were evaluated as if the plans had generated 
unfavorable outcomes after implementation.  An analysis of students’ reactions to the Statecraft 
simulation, their performance in the simulation, and other data showed no obvious association between 
Statecraft and changes in student perceptions of their decision making.  
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Introduction 
This research project began when the author read two sentences written by Daniel Kahneman 
(2012: 203), recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences: “Hindsight bias has pernicious 
effects on the evaluations of decision-makers. It leads observers to assess the quality of a decision not by 
whether the process was sound but whether its outcome was good or bad.” These sentences made me 
wonder if the ways in which undergraduates made decisions, or at least their perceptions of what 
constituted a good decision, could be changed through experience. I hypothesized that the tendency 
toward hindsight bias in evaluating decisions might diminish if students repeatedly practiced decision 
making in a simulation, and that this could be measured by asking students their opinions about how such 
decisions had been made. I selected Statecraft as the simulation to use and obtained an IRB waiver for the 
project. 
Decision making has long been an area of interest in political science; the literature is filled with 
studies of bounded rationality, bureaucratic bargaining, and other theoretical models. Sound decision 
making in foreign policy is recognized as particularly difficult, because “problems in foreign policy are ill 
structured. Goals are often multiple and vaguely defined, one or more constraints are open, information is 
ambiguous and incomplete, and little may be known about the solution to the problem” (Stein and Welch 
1997:56). As a result, the decisions of policymakers “may reflect assumptions that are questionable or 
untrue” (Larson 2003: 5). Though changes in the decision making process might make favorable foreign 
policy outcomes more likely, such outcomes are not guaranteed (Renshon 2003: 46). 
Simulations 
Studies of decision making in political science are often situated within the context of gaming or 
simulations (Mayer 2009; Brewer 1984; Abt 1970; Guetzkow and Jensen 1966). Such simulations can 
range from a simple classroom demonstration of Prisoner’s Dilemma (Raymond 2011 and Asal 2005) to 
the use of card games that illustrate theories of international political economy (Boyer, Trumbore, and 
Fricke 2011), to complex role-playing exercises such as ICONS and the Global Problems Summit that 
focus on international negotiation and conflict resolution (Starkey and Blake 2001 and Krain and Lantis 
2006, respectively). In some cases, participants interact only with a computer-based representation of 
reality, but more frequently, simulations function as environments in which participants communicate, 
negotiate, and decide either face-to-face or via online communication (Chasek 2005; Shellman and Turan 
2003; Kaufman 1998; Mandel 1987). 
Simulations have been applied in the teaching of many academic disciplines; they are commonly 
regarded as being able to help students learn facts and concepts (Baranowski 2006; Bredemeier and 
Greenblat 1981; Heitzmann 1973), produce high levels of student engagement with course content and 
peers (Torney-Purta 1998), and generate positive student attitudinal and behavioral changes (Williams 
and Williams 2010; Dorn 1989; Tamminga 1977). Their perceived ability to simultaneously target 
students’ cognitive, behavioral and emotional domains while challenging student attitudes and 
presuppositions makes them highly attractive pedagogical tools (Davidson et al. 2009:153), and the study 
of their pedagogical utility is part of a broader literature advocating the superiority of active and 
experiential instructional techniques over traditional teaching methods. For example, Crossley-Frolick 
asserts that standard methods of teaching about theories and institutions in undergraduate international 
relations courses 
often do not provide the opportunity for students to explore the importance of negotiation, 
bargaining, diplomacy, contingency, incentive structures, and strategy in the context of such 
organizations. Nor do they adequately expose students to the significant limit that international 
organizations face . . . This is where simulations can improve student learning experiences 
(2010:185). 
Advocates of active and experiential learning assert that simulations have two main advantages 
over traditional teaching methods. First, simulations can improve students’ motivation to learn by 
delivering information to students in a way that heightens their interest in understanding it. Through 
prompt feedback, challenging but achievable goals, uncertain outcomes, and the generation of feelings of 
autonomy, accomplishment, relevance, relatedness to others, and pleasure among participants, 
simulations can enhance students’ extrinsic and intrinsic motivation (Carnes 2011; Koh et al. 2010; 
Mitchell and Savill-Smith 2004). According to de Freitas (2006:350), “[o]ne of the main perceived 
advantages of using games and simulations [is] increased motivational levels for learners.” Identifying 
specific causal relationships between simulation, motivation, and learning can be difficult, however, and 
much of the evidence on the subject reported in the literature is anecdotal (Stroessner, Beckerman, and 
Whittaker 2009:605; de Freitas 2006:35). Motivation “often is inferred from learning [but] learning 
usually is the indicator of motivation” (Weiner 1990:618); similarly, affective response can be both a 
product of and an influence on motivation (Katt and Condly 2009:219). For example, Machemer and 
Crawford (2007:9) found that students valued any classroom activity—whether active or traditional—that 
directly related to improved exam performance. Furthermore, intrinsic motivation is likely to be high only 
if students’ expectations of success and the value placed on success are high (Ehrman and Oxford 
1995:68). 
Second, simulations substitute peer-to-peer instruction and self-discovery—learning through 
experience—for the passive receipt of information from an instructor—learning solely through thought. 
The distinction between thought and experience in theories of learning, and the supposed superiority of 
the latter, derives from the work of American educational philosopher John Dewey (1916) and was more 
recently elaborated by Kolb (1984). Kolb (1984:30) argued that the experience, reflection, abstraction, 
and experimentation are all necessary components of learning. Following Kolb’s (1984) logic, students 
who participate in a simulation can initially observe and reflect upon the effects of their behavior, then 
form abstract generalizations as they seek to understand what they have experienced, and finally can test 
these generalizations against new observations. By participating in a simulation students can easily match 
“theoretical concepts with empirical, accessible behavior” (Enterline and Jepsen 2009:58) to a degree that 
is unlikely in traditional forms of instruction. Yet the effectiveness of simulations’ experiential aspects 
remains a matter of debate despite several decades of investigation. Krain and Lantis (2006:404) found 
that both an experiential simulation and traditional lecture and discussion had “statistically significant 
positive effects on student learning, regardless of instructor or issue area,” though possibly in different 
ways. Powner and Allendoerfer (2008) found that students who participated in a brief role-play activity 
scored better on multiple choice questions after the activity than students who participated in classroom 
discussion, but that there was no statistically significant differences in the overall performance of the two 
groups. Stroessner, Beckerman, and Whittaker et al. (2009:614) found that role play exercises in the 
Reacting to the Past simulation produced no statistically significant benefit in writing skills among first-
year college students, and that the benefit to students’ rhetorical skills was “marginal.” Raymond (2010) 
found no statistically significant improvements in exam scores among students who participated in a role-
playing simulation compared to students who received traditional lectures and assignments in an 
international relations course.  
In sum, the efficacy of simulations in enabling students to achieve desired learning outcomes has 
not been comprehensively validated, in part due to the frequent failure to properly align simulations with 
course learning objectives or assessment regimes (Raymond and Usherwood 2013). As Krain and Lantis 
(2006:399, 400) write, “very few studies confirm our experiences (and convictions) that [simulation] 
exercises are truly effective methods for teaching political science and international relations” because 
such exercises “have remained generally untested in any rigorous fashion.” 
The Cognitive Approach to Decision Making 
Studies have found that temporal and contextual biases frequently affect decision making, leading 
to outcomes not predicted by rational choice models of utility maximization (Kahneman 2012; Krueger 
and Acevedo 2007; Budescu and Maciejovsky 2005; Stein and Welch 1997; Quattrone and Tversky 1988; 
Kahneman and Tversky 1979 and 1984). In response to these findings, cognitive psychologists have 
concentrated on “identifying and categorizing the filters through which people process information and 
the simplifying mechanisms they employ to help them make sense of the world” (Stein and Welch 
1997:53). For example, the pain associated with a potential loss is frequently perceived as greater than the 
pleasure derived from a potential gain, even when the absolute size and probability of either outcome is 
equal, leading to a “preference for the status quo over alternatives with the same expected value” 
(Quattrone and Tversky 1988:724). Hindsight bias causes people’s perceptions of the reasons why they 
do things to be affected “by the knowledge of the outcome of their actions” (Sligo and Stirton 1998:112). 
Hindsight bias leads individuals to distort their evaluation of their original decisions and the factors that 
influenced them (Bukszar and Connolly 1988:639), and groups can overestimate the probability of 
successful outcomes for current decisions if they have experienced success in the past, leading them to 
take unwarranted risks (Burnstein and Berbaum 1983:554). Hindsight bias can be especially influential in 
infrequent situations where decisions have enormous impacts, such as natural disasters, military conflicts, 
and political crises. While individuals who have encountered a problem “in similar forms numerous times 
before and have experienced appropriate feedback from their natural environment” are likely to solve a 
problem effectively (Budescu and Maciejovsky 2005:1842), decision makers often draw inappropriate 
lessons from events that have occurred infrequently and tend to discount potential harm from situations 
never previously encountered (Camerer and Kunreuther 1989:576 and Kirkwood 1999:35). 
Hindsight bias is decreased in situations where outcomes are surprising or outcome-consistent 
information is presented in novel ways (Sanna and Schwarz 2006:174). Failure can also improve decision 
making if it challenges the status quo. Highly predictable failures “provide no new information, but 
unanticipated failures that challenge old ways of representing problems are more likely to stimulate new 
formulations. Responding to failure, leaders can ‘learn through experimentation’ (Campbell 1969, 
Hedberg 1981)” (Stein and Welch 1997:56). Also, when faced with the need to make a decision, 
individuals who “are explicitly encouraged to think of reasons why they might be wrong are less likely to 
persist with initially incorrect impressions of a problem” (Tetlock 1992:526). 
The Statecraft Simulation 
A simulation like Statecraft, with its multiple turns, unfamiliar environment, surprising outcomes, 
and constant feedback, seemed to be a promising environment in which to examine changes in students’ 
perceptions about their decision making; however, studies of the Statecraft simulation were absent from 
the peer-reviewed literature. Executives at Digital World Construction, the company that produces 
Statecraft, were not aware of any such literature being published.  
Statecraft does happen to share many of the same features of other simulations that have been 
used to model or teach international relations. Statecraft assigns tangible rewards in the form of points to 
participants if their teams achieve particular goals, but competition for scarce resources, conflicting 
domestic and international interests, and the varied personalities and values of individual participants 
make goals difficult to achieve and drive differences in team behavior. The teams themselves represent 
fictional nation-states, and team member is assigned a role that nominally has specific responsibilities 
within each nation-state’s government, such as secretary of defense. Prior to the start of Statecraft, 
members of each team select a country name, city names, government positions for each participant, a 
government type (such as constitutional monarchy or military dictatorship), and two country attributes 
(industrial, green, militaristic, pacifist, or scientific).  The government type and attributes affect the 
incentive structure for each team in the simulation.  
The simulation unfolds through a series of turns; in each turn, the nation-states produce limited 
amounts of gold, food, steel, scientific knowledge, and oil—resources that can be used to build military 
capabilities or domestic structures, or be traded with other nation-states. Teams can also invest resources 
in research that speeds the acquisition of prerequisite technologies; for example, a nation-state must reach 
the technological level of “advanced medicine” before it can begin building hospitals. 
Statecraft also rates each nation-state on the basis of health, welfare, environment, safety, 
education, and culture; these ratings can be improved with the purchase of hospitals, welfare offices, and 
prisons.  Each team must also try to manage the approval ratings of six domestic factions (capitalists, 
socialists, environmentalists, nationalists, civil libertarians, and intellectuals). For example, if a team 
decides to build a factory, which increases gold production but also increases pollution, the nation-state’s 
capitalist faction will be pleased but the approval rating of the environmentalists will fall.  If any faction’s 
approval rating decreases to thirty-five percent, it will engage in demonstrations, riots, and strikes that 
consume the nation-state’s resources. 
In writing assignments, debriefings, and the final exam, students readily identify parallels 
between Statecraft, the real world, and the field of international relations. As outlined by Rosen (2011), 
[a]lthough the countries, domestic factions, and global issues in Statecraft are fictional, they have 
been carefully designed to provide maximum insight into parallel real-world dilemmas: as 
students grapple with the Orion slavery issue, the threat posed by the melting Ice Mountain, and 
the temptation to seize Sapphire Island’s vast resources they come to understand the security 
dilemma, the tragedy of the commons, two-level games, the challenges of cooperation under 
anarchy, and many other constructs not as theoretical concepts but as visceral truths. 
 One of the main advantages of Statecraft for the course instructor is the simulation’s high degree 
of automated record keeping. Teams execute resource trades, purchases of structures, military attacks, and 
treaties through the Statecraft website, with the results automatically tabulated, and the website also 
tracks the approval ratings of the domestic factions, resource levels, and points accumulated for each team 
in real time. The website also allows students to communicate with each other online, which facilitates the 
ability of participants to negotiate and reach decisions outside of the classroom.   
The Course 
Statecraft was employed in an honors section of an introductory international relations course 
during the Fall 2012 semester. This course fulfills a university core curriculum requirement and is most 
frequently taken by students in their first year of college. This particular class contained thirty-four 
students: twenty-four first-year students, five sophomores, one junior, and four seniors. Eleven students 
were male; twenty-three were female. 
The author had taught sections of this course previously and had used it to study the possible 
effects of another simulation, but had not used Statecraft before. As argued by Asal and Blake (2006), 
simulations are most effective as teaching tools when they include robust mechanisms for preparation, 
interaction, and debriefing. 
[P]reparation . . . provides students with the opportunity to study the subject matter of the 
simulation and the role that they are portraying . . . During the interaction stage, students . 
. . put their learning from the preparation phase into action. Exchanges with their 
counterparts can challenge their thinking and push them to delve deeper into the content. 
The interactions also allow students to apply and test different strategies for achieving 
their goals. Finally, the debriefing stage gives students the chance to internalize the 
lessons of the simulation. Without guidance and time for reflection, students may not be 
able to make the connection between what they learned in the simulation and the 
concepts that or processes that the instructor was trying to illustrate (Asal and Blake 
2006: 2). 
The author integrated Statecraft into the course with the above in mind. Although lecture material 
and some assignments in the course were the same as in past semesters, much was new and oriented 
around the subject of decision making. Joachim Remak’s  The Origins of World War I: 1871-1914 (New 
York: Harcourt, 1995) and Barbara Tuchman’s The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1984) were required texts for the course, and these books were augmented by other, 
shorter readings, primarily peer-reviewed journal articles. Students were required to write fifteen 
responses to prompts on readings over the semester; the prompts were argumentative in nature and asked 
students about international relations theories and decision making; for example, “Which international 
relations theory best explains Roosevelt’s decision making prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941? 
Why?” These assignments were submitted before class through the course website and formed twenty-
five percent of the student’s final grade. Students’ written responses to these questions functioned as a 
basis for class discussions.  
To formatively assess the acquisition of content knowledge, students took five multiple choice 
online quizzes during the semester, worth one-fourth of the final grade. Quiz questions covered basic 
concepts from international relations theories and were intended to reinforce connections in students’ 
minds between information presented in lectures and what students experienced in Statecraft. Summative 
assessment occurred through a final exam worth one-sixth of the final grade.  
The Statecraft simulation independently accounted for twenty-five percent of the final grade, and 
included several different components. Students took two quizzes on the Statecraft instruction manual to 
help them learn about rules and procedures of the simulation, and during each turn of the simulation they 
wrote memos of at least 300 words in which they reviewed their teams’ accomplishments in the 
simulation’s previous turn and discussed their objectives for the current turn. There were also four in-
class pre-mortem assignments during the simulation, an exercise specifically recommended by Kahneman 
(2012:250) for learning how to avoid creating forecasts that are unrealistically close to best-case 
scenarios. In the pre-mortem exercises, students (1) imagined that the plans they had agreed upon with 
their teammates for the current turn had produced disastrous outcomes, (2) wrote a brief history of the 
disaster, and (3) reconvened with their teammates for discussion and reevaluation of decisions that their 
teams had made. The simulation concluded with a 4-5 page paper in which students were asked to apply 
common international relations concepts—such as the effects of economic interdependence and 
polarity—to events that had occurred during Statecraft. 
The points earned by teams according to their performance in Statecraft were counted as extra 
credit toward students’ final grades, which was computed on a 600 point scale. Members of the worst 
performing team in Statecraft earned eight points and members of the best performing team earned 
twenty-three points. 
Data on students’ perceptions of their teams’ decision making in Statecraft were collected 
through six surveys administered online as the simulation progressed. The surveys began in the second 
turn of the simulation and ended on the seventh turn, and they asked the following questions: 
1) How satisfied are you with the outcome (results) of the decisions made by your team in the previous 
turn of Statecraft? 
2) How satisfied are you with the decision-making process used by your team so far in Statecraft?  
3) If you answered "Somewhat Dissatisfied" or "Very Dissatisfied" to Question 2, what will you try to 
do differently in future turns of Statecraft? If you answered "Somewhat Satisfied" or "Very Satisfied" 
to Question 2, what will you try to continue doing? 
4) How satisfied are you with the decisions made so far in the current turn by your team? 
5) Please comment on your reasons for any of your answers to the previous questions. 
Survey questions (1), (2), and (4) were formatted on a Likert scale that ranged from “very satisfied” to 
“very dissatisfied.”  
Analysis of Student Reactions 
 Students demonstrated a very high level of interest in Statecraft. The class met on Mondays, 
Wednesdays, and Fridays at 9:00 a.m., with the Monday class devoted entirely to Statecraft for the eight 
weeks of the simulation. On Monday mornings, students were already seated and engaged in discussions 
and negotiations by the time the class officially started. Responses to the post-simulation written 
debriefing indicated that Statecraft was very well received by students, especially on the following items: 
• I would recommend this course to other students (average score 4.50 out of 5 points). 
• The Statecraft simulation was an enjoyable and worthwhile experience (4.35). 
• The analysis paper on Statecraft will help me understand international politics and IR theories 
(4.20). 
• My team functioned well as a group (4.14). 
• Statecraft helped me understand international politics (4.03). 
The written debriefing also asked students if they communicated with their teammates in person 
or via online means outside of class, and if so, how frequently. Twenty-six out of the thirty-one 
respondents responded that their teams met in person outside of class, often for an hour each week. 
Twenty-two of the students stated that they communicated online with teammates outside of class during 
the simulation. Many said this occurred on a regular basis, often up to an hour per week. It appears that 
Statecraft stimulated a fair amount of engagement among students outside of the classroom. 
The theme of communication also appeared in students’ comments on the written debriefing 
Students recommended making sure that all team members were well-informed even if that necessitated 
meeting outside of class, being open-minded enough to consider different opinions, and giving team 
members equal weight in decision making. Some noted that efficient and quick decision making occurred 
when everyone on the team spoke their minds and contributed their expertise. One student wrote that the 
lack of input from some team members negatively affected that team’s decision making. Another 
recommended that each person on a team present an idea or course of action each time the team meets. 
In comments on what they learned from Statecraft about decision making in the context of 
international politics, students referenced the following subjects: 
• The environment in which leaders must make decisions is complex, fluid, and/or unpredictable; it 
often reflects competing interests, different interests, or a two-level game, as outlined by Putnam 
(1988). One student wrote “it is nearly impossible to come to a decision that everyone will be 
happy with. It is better to make unpopular decisions than none at all.” While one student noted 
that he or she believed that a consistent foreign policy brings more success, others stated 
“everything is constantly changing and new decisions are always being revised and improved” 
and “sometimes accepting change is a good thing.” 
• Different actors might pursue different and conflicting strategies of self-reliance, cooperation, or 
bargaining, but norms of behavior can develop that facilitate alliances and trade between nation-
states, which result in tangible benefits. One student said “countries must work together to 
survive.” 
• International actors must evaluate the possible outcomes or consequences of decisions and this 
evaluation frequently reflects cost-benefit calculations. However, decisions are often affected by 
the dynamics, cohesiveness, and/or individual influence and persuasiveness within a nation-
state’s leadership. 
The complete list of the written debriefing items, scores, and number of respondents is located in 
Appendix A.  
In the six online surveys, students indicated an extremely high level of satisfaction with decision 
making processes and outcomes during Statecraft, a result that was unexpected by the author. If responses 
are grouped into two categories of “satisfied” and “dissatisfied” (ignoring middle scores of “uncertain”), 
the data shows that an overwhelming majority of students were satisfied with the decision making that 
occurred within their teams throughout the simulation. Trend lines for the students’ average ratings on the 
satisfaction-related survey questions are shown in Figure 1.  
 
<insert Figure 1 here> 
 
The first time the survey was administered (N= 30), 92 percent of respondents for Question 1 – 
“How satisfied are you with the outcome (results) of the decisions made by your team in the previous turn 
of Statecraft?” – were satisfied and no respondents indicated dissatisfaction (again, the middle scores of 
“uncertain” are being excluded from consideration). For the sixth and last survey (N = 26), 72 percent of 
respondents indicated satisfaction and 14 percent indicated dissatisfaction for Question 1. For Question 2 
– “How satisfied are you with the decision-making process used by your team so far in Statecraft?” – 86 
percent of respondents were satisfied and 3 percent were unsatisfied in the first survey, while in the sixth 
survey, 84 percent were satisfied and 10 percent were dissatisfied. For Question 4 – “How satisfied are 
you with the decisions made so far in the current turn by your team?” – 92 percent indicated satisfied and 
only 3 percent indicated dissatisfaction on the first survey, and on the sixth survey, 87 percent indicated 
satisfaction and 3 percent indicated dissatisfaction. 
In sum, as measured by the six surveys, average satisfaction with decision making declined 
slightly but remained very high over time, making it extremely difficult to identify whether or how 
students’ perceptions of their teams’ decision making might have changed during Statecraft. Only 
fourteen of the thirty-four students in the class selected a response of “somewhat dissatisfied” or “very 
dissatisfied” on any of the six surveys. However, the frequency of dissatisfied responses nearly doubled 
between the fourth and fifth surveys (taken in the fifth and sixth turns of the simulation, respectively), and 
remained higher for the sixth survey (taken in the seventh turn) than reported in the surveys taken during 
the first half of the simulation.  
 Could team performance have caused the small increase in dissatisfaction reported by these 
fourteen students? In an attempt to answer this question, the number of students on a team who responded 
“somewhat dissatisfied” or “very dissatisfied” on any of the six surveys was compared in a scatter plot 
against the number of points earned by members of that team. No relationship between reports of 
dissatisfaction and team performance was found. Also, the total number of “somewhat dissatisfied” and 
“very dissatisfied” responses for a team was compared in a second scatter plot against the points earned 
by members of that team. Again no relationship was found. 
Responses to the surveys’ open-ended questions suggested that students’ feelings of 
dissatisfaction with team decision making stemmed from perceptions about intra-team communication. 
One student wrote:  
“I am only somewhat satisfied with the outcomes . . . because two of our group members 
ignore the rest of the team. Two other team members only contribute one idea, if we are 
lucky, and otherwise act as bobble heads . . . after trying many different ways with 
another team member to try and change what is occurring I am no longer willing to let 
only two people influence my grades.” 
Effective communication among teammates, on the other hand, was reported as extremely 
beneficial to team performance; for example, one student wrote:  
“The past few turns have proven to be our most successful yet due largely to our great 
communication efforts. Lately, we have actually been meeting face to face outside of the 
classroom to discuss our final decisions for each turn. This has been efficient and allowed 
us to ALL voice our opinions.”  
Conclusions 
Because Statecraft generated such an overwhelmingly favorable reaction among students, the 
hypothesis that the simulation might positively affect student perceptions of decision making could not be 
adequately tested. The data collected through surveys on student satisfaction with decision making 
processes and outcomes did not vary enough to clearly identify any change, and the small amount of 
dissatisfaction that was expressed in the surveys seems to be driven more by frustration with temporarily 
faulty communication among team members rather than by bad decision making per se.  
The group context in which decisions were made should not have obscured observation of the 
effects of hindsight bias. While economists generally assume that competitive institutions eliminate 
individual biases like “averaging cancels out random noise,” theories of cognitive psychology stress that 
“fallacies and biases that plague individuals are robust and systematic [and] survive and affect behavior at 
the aggregate level” (Budescu and Maciejovsky 2005:1841-1842). This study’s failure to detect a change 
in the presence of hindsight bias over the duration of the simulation thus points to the survey instruments 
being an inadequate method of assessment. The sample size of thirty-four individuals also makes it 
difficult to determine how Statecraft may have affected students’ decision making. 
Future research on how Statecraft might affect students’ decision making should therefore 
include a pre-test/post-test instrument in which students are presented with fictional examples of decision 
making. Each example should contain information on the process used to reach a decision and the 
outcome of that decision. If students are asked to evaluate similar scenarios before and after Statecraft, it 
may be possible to detect whether the simulation is associated with a decrease in hindsight bias among 
students. A second run of the experiment should also include a larger sample, perhaps by running 
Statecraft in multiple sections of the course or across successive semesters; however, this is difficult to 
achieve because the author teaches the course every other year and other instructors use different 
approaches and teach different content. 
  
 Appendix A – Results of Statecraft Debriefing Survey 
 
Table 5 Scores 
  5 4 3 2 1 N Average 
The Statecraft simulation was an enjoyable and worthwhile 
experience. 13 17 0 1 0 31 4.354839 
Statecraft helped me understand international politics. 6 19 3 1 0 29 4.034483 
Statecraft helped me understand how to apply ideas from 
lectures, discussions, and readings. 5 20 2 2 0 29 3.965517 
My team functioned well as a group. 5 16 0 1 0 22 4.136364 
Participating in Statecraft helped me improve my decision-
making skills. 6 17 8 1 0 32* 3.875 
Lectures, readings, and discussions on readings helped me 
imporve my decision-making skills. 5 19 5 2 0 31 3.870968 
The memo assignments helped me get more out of the 
Statecraft experience. 3 10 7 6 4 30 3.066667 
The premortem assignments helped me get more out of the 
Statecraft experience. 3 14 6 3 1 27 3.555556 
Statecraft caused me to think more about the practice of 
international politics. 4 20 4 1 0 29 3.931034 
The memo assignments helped me better understand ideas from 
lectures, discussions, and readings. 1 8 11 6 4 30 2.866667 
The premortem assignments helped me understand how to 
apply ideas from lectures, discussions, and readings. 2 12 10 3 2 29 3.310345 
The analysis paper on Statecraft will help me understand 
international politics and IR theories. 15 9 3 3 0 30 4.2 
I would recommend this course to other students. 17 11 2 0 0 30 4.5 
 
*One student checked more than one box checked for this item; both scores are used. 
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